Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 8, 2024, Syria has entered a sensitive and complex transitional period, led by interim president Ahmad al-Sharaa. This new phase has raised urgent questions about Syria’s future after Assad. How can a new Syria emerge that avoids repeating the mistakes of the past and prevents the country from descending into new tragedies?
This essential question opens the door to others, the most pressing of which is: What were the main factors behind Assad’s fall? And what lessons should any future leadership learn to avoid a similar fate and prevent another national disaster?
Domestically, Bashar al-Assad made a series of grave mistakes that ultimately led to the downfall of his regime. Chief among them was his prioritization of security services over state institutions, his sectarian approach to distributing power and wealth, and his brutal crackdown on peaceful demonstrations during the 2011 uprising. These actions escalated the revolution into armed conflict and civil war.
Economic corruption and the monopolization of wealth by a small elite close to the ruling family further deepened poverty and hastened the regime’s economic collapse. These policies widened national divisions, weakened state institutions, and eroded public trust. Worse still, the regime offered no genuine reforms to extinguish the uprising—instead, it clung to violence and rejected all alternative political paths, which harbingered the beginning of its end.
On foreign policy, Assad made a fatal strategic error by fully aligning with the Tehran-Moscow axis. This opened the door to foreign interventions that turned Syria into a battleground for international conflict, stripped the regime of its sovereignty, and undermined its diplomatic maneuverability. Furthermore, Assad missed key opportunities to restore ties with Arab states due to his unwavering loyalty to his allies and his regime’s involvement in trafficking captagon across the region.
Since assuming the interim presidency, Ahmad al-Sharaa has taken a different approach in several respects. So far, results have been mixed. On the positive side, he has expressed openness to the international community and adopted a conciliatory, inclusive tone in domestic affairs. However, he has been unable to translate this rhetoric into actual stability and security across all the territories supposedly under his government’s control.
This raises a serious risk: that al-Sharaa may fall into Assad’s trap of promising reforms without delivering. Failure to follow through would undermine his popular credibility and erode the temporary legitimacy he has gained through these promises.
Externally, al-Sharaa and his government have adopted a balanced regional policy, engaging with Turkey, the Gulf states, and Europe without becoming dependent on any single axis. This has allowed for broader diplomatic space and succeeded in convincing the U.S. and the EU to lift some economic sanctions on Syria. However, the lifting of sanctions is conditional on fulfilling his promises—meaning al-Sharaa’s leadership now faces the same test domestically and internationally: how to maintain credibility through commitment and follow through.
Worrisome signs are beginning to emerge regarding his ability to do so, such as the continued influence of remnants of the old security apparatus in parts of the state, the slow progress on transitional justice, and the delayed inclusion of the external opposition in the political process. There are also concerns about the rise of new economic power centers that could reproduce corruption in a different form.
While Assad’s regime refused any structural change, today’s transitional government—despite its flaws—still has a chance to rebuild the state on new foundations.
Ahmad al-Sharaa’s transitional legitimacy—both domestically and internationally—depends on his ability to fulfill his promises. If he succeeds, there is a real opportunity for a unified Syrian future. But the greatest danger today is to squander this chance by repeating past errors: excluding rivals, sidelining justice, tolerating militias, or ignoring the informal economy.
Syria’s future will not be built simply on the fall of Bashar al-Assad, but on the ability of Syrian society and its new political elites to fully dismantle the legacy of his regime—not merely rebrand it. This transitional phase is a true test of the Syrian people’s political will and leadership to break from the past and forge a new beginning that can prevent another catastrophe.