Nearly a year after the collapse of the Assad regime, and over six months since the much-lauded March 10 Agreement signed between Syrian Interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa and Syrian Democratic Forces General Commander Mazloum Abdi, debate continues regarding the future of Syrian governance, and tensions continue to rise following violence against the country’s Alawite and Druze and Christian minorities.
Decades of highly centralized, authoritarian rule by the al-Assad family and the Ba’ath Party ended in Syria in December 2024 when Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) swept across regime-held Syria, taking Damascus in a matter of weeks. Negotiations between HTS and the other major political and military actors in Syria began almost immediately, with particular focus and emphasis being placed on negotiations with our region and the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria.
While large-scale hostilities have been avoided, and some successes have been achieved, including local agreements on the Autonomous Administration-governed Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiyeh neighborhoods of Aleppo, which are holding strong despite recent tensions, and the formation of negotiating committees with representatives from HTS’s Interim Government and the Autonomous Administration, significant points of disagreement continue to persist between the two sides, as well as among the international community, on how Syria should be structured politically moving forward.
For decades, Syria has been governed by centralized, totalitarian rule. Ethnic and religious minorities were largely repressed and their existence denied. The speaking of languages other than Arabic was not only discouraged, but often punished. Regions far from Syria’s major cities and hubs, such as Deir-ez-Zor and Hasakah, were neglected.
However, for more than a decade, North-East Syria has been governed by the Autonomous Administration, which has developed and promoted a model of decentralization, in which local councils, reflecting the ethnic and religious make-up of their communities, have been built up to effectively address issues faced by their respective regions.
This has opened up opportunities for North-East Syria’s minority communities to be educated in their own languages, publicly celebrate their holidays, and address issues specific to them. Furthermore, Syria’s regions, such as Hasakah and Raqqa, have been able to benefit from this model as well, as the challenges they face are not necessarily shared by other parts of the country.
Despite the history of centralization leading to repression in Syria, the recent massacres conducted against Syria’s Alawite and Druze minorities by extremist gunmen, the widespread desire to avoid future conflict in the country, the Interim Government in Damascus has been hesitant to accept the model of the Autonomous Administration, while not ruling out some forms of regional autonomy. While there is fear amongst some that autonomy and decentralization could lead to Syria’s fragmentation, the comparative stability and peace found in Syria’s northeast support the Autonomous Administration’s claims that in order to unify, support, and guarantee Syria’s peaceful and prosperous future, all of Syria’s regions and communities must feel that they have a true, protected stake and voice in the governance of their own communities and lives.
What is most essential, however, is that whatever form decentralization and autonomy take in Syria’s future is agreed upon by the government in Damascus, the Autonomous Administration, the Druze leadership in Suwayda, the Alawite community on the coast, the Sunni community, and all of Syria’s many actors through peaceful negotiation, and with the support of the international community, in order to ensure that hostile actors such as ISIS do not take attempt to spoil Syria’s future, and that Syria can effectively rebuild into a peaceful and stable country.